This paper develops a matching model in the director market with outside options to explain the equilibrium board quality. Based on Hermalin (2005) and Gabaix and Landier (2007) , the board of directors has the function of monitoring and advising to a¤ect the earning of …rm assuming that the impact of a CEO's quality increases with the size of the …rm under his control. I also consider two possible relationships between the CEO quality and the board quality, complement and substitute, in the …rm. This model shows that the big …rms make board positions more attractive compared to outside options. Second, when the marginal contribution of the CEO's talent to the performance (the source of reputation value enjoyed by the board member) is large enough, the talented CEO can be matched with the high quali…ed outside directors. It follows that the board quality increases. Additionally, the model can explain the observed fact that the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed. The estimations suggest that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the …rms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales to work as outside directors. The evidence for the e¤ect of the incumbent CEO's talent is mixed. I also …nd that the …rms which have a large amount of sales pay more to outside directors. The compensation for directors, however, does not a¤ect the quality of boards.
Introduction
Many researches have explored the characteristic of board and reached the consensus that e¢ cient board should be composed of a majority of outside director. Colley and Stettinius (2003) argue that one of the good attributes of board of director is to have no more than two insiders directors on board. The reason is that board satisfying this criterion can be considered more independent. Since many people believe that outside directors would be more likely to represent the shareholder's preference due to relative independence, this view is widely accepted. It naturally follows that economic literatures analyze the optimal board independence. Boards have two major functions: monitoring and advising on management. We can predict that these two functions are key determinants of board structures. Adams and Ferreira (2007) and Raheja (2005) provide theoretical background for the structure of board. They argue that the board structure optimally respond to the bene…t and cost of monitoring and advising. Lehn, Patro and Zhao (2004) and Linck, Netter and Yang (2006a) empirically support this argument.
There exists another important aspect of board, the quality of board. Fama (1980) argues that managers of high-performing …rms are more likely to become outside directors of …rms because the market values directors according to their e¢ cacy as managers. The market thinks that they have the expertness to guide and monitor managerial behavior.
Many research also conclude that …rms prefer high quali…ed directors. (See Fama and Jensen (1983) , Gilson (1990) , Kaplan and Reishus (1990) , Li (1997) , Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) and Keys and Li (2004) ). A little light, however, has been shed on the determination of the boards quality. Gabaix and Landier (2007) propose a simple competitive assignment model in the CEO market to explain the CEO compensation. They assume that CEOs have heterogeneous talent level and are assigned to …rms competitively. Also, the managerial impact of a CEO's talent increase with the value of the …rm under his control and CEOs earn the value of their marginal product. Under these assumptions, they suggest that the best CEO goes to the largest …rms and the CEO's pay increases in the size of …rm and the size of average …rm in the economy. Their empirical …nding supports these predictions.
The most important determinant of the CEO compensation is the size of …rms. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) propose a model to explain the organization of work in a knowledge economy. They show a positive sorting in a sense that highly quali…ed managers are matched with the higher ability subordinates. The main driving force is that the managers can share their ability with the workers under their control. In line with these notions, I ask where the talented candidates go to work as outside directors and whether the good CEOs are matched with the good board members or not. This paper develops a simple matching model in the director market with outside options to explain the board quality. The quality of outside directors on boards has a direct (advising) and an indirect (monitoring) mechanism to a¤ect the earning of …rms assuming that the impact of CEO's quality increase in the value/size of …rms under his control 1 in this model. First, an outside director contributes to the earning of …rms directly by advising on the management. In this aspect, I consider two possible relationships between the CEO quality and the board quality, complement and substitute, in the organization of …rm. They can interact each other positively, but it could be the case that the CEO can dominate the decision making or the decision of the CEO can be overriden by the board, too. Second, a highly quali…ed director increases the probability of …nding the true quality of incumbent CEO. On the demand side, the …rm would like to …ll a vacancy with a candidate satisfying the minimum quality level. The minimum quality level is analyzed based on Pissarides (2000) . He provides the excellent work for searching and matching in the labor market to incorporate the market condition (matching function). On the supply side, a potential candidate for outside directors compares the money value (board compensation) plus reputation value (depending on the performance of …rm) generated by the directorship to the outside option value. If the outside option is so good for the highly quali…ed candidates, they would not contact the …rm which creates a vacancy for the outside director. Henceforth, the quality of boards is determined by random matching between the minimum quality level required by …rm and the cuto¤ (maximum) quality level of the potential candidates who are likely to contact.
This model shows that the size of …rms would a¤ect the board quality in the following manner. The larger size makes the earning of …rms more sensitive to the board quality, so that the larger sized …rms pay more to outside directors. Also, the big …rms give more reputation values (generated by the performance of the …rm) to board members. Conclusively, the large size makes board positions more attractive to the talented candidates for outside directors. Additionally, only when the marginal contribution of the CEO's talent to the performance of …rm is large enough, the more talented CEO can induce the high quali…ed candidates. Suppose that there is "complementarity" between the quality of CEO and board of directors. When the expected talent of the incumbent CEO rises, the monitoring role becomes less important, but the advising role becomes more important.
Thus, when the gain of advising is large enough, the board compensation increases in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO. Even if the board compensation decreases in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO, the large reputational gain generated by the increase in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO can make the board position more attractive. In the "substitute" case, the board compensation decreases in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO becasue the good CEO can dominate the decision-making or the decision of the CEO can be overridden by the board. So, only when the marginal contribution of the CEO's talent to the reputation value enjoyed by outside directors is large enough, the more talented CEO can be matched with the good board member. 1 We can interpret this assumption in the following manners: (1) The real power comes from the amount of resource which the CEO can allocate. (2) The "Size-Skill Complementarity" exists in the hierarchies of …rm. Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) suggest that the ability of managers could be ampli…ed by the amount of controllable resource in the hierarchies of …rm because talented employees can share their ability (or knowledge) with the team under their control. In what follows, the more talented employees hold higher positions in the equilibrium. Finally, the model suggests the possibility that the talented candidates (good …rms) are sometimes matched to the bad (of course, not too bad) …rms (candidates) and the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed.
The empirical evidence supports the prediction of size e¤ect. The estimations show that the talented ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs go to the …rms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. The evidence for the e¤ect of incumbent CEO's talent is mixed. I also …nd that the …rms which have a large amount of sales pay more to outside directors. Additionally, the statistics shows the dispersion of directors'quality on the same boards.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I provide a brief review of the related literature. In section 3, I develop a model and provides the empirical predictions. The Section 4 describes the data set and the empirical results. I summarize concluding remarks in Section 5.
Related literature
This paper is mainly related with a …eld which studies the quality of boards. They focus on the relationship between the quality of potential candidates for outside directors and the probability of serving as outside directors on boards. Fama (1980) argues that managers of high-performing …rms are more likely to become outside directors of …rms because the market prices directors according to their e¢ cacy as managers. The market thinks that they have attributes necessary to guide and monitor managerial behavior. Kaplan and Reishus (1990) …nd that the probability of a CEO taking on an outside direct orship is positively related to their …rm's performance. Li (1997) provides evidences that the labor market for directors is well functioning and the market prices directors based on their performance as directors. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) analyze directorships held by 277 CEOs who retired during [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] after they retired and show that accounting performance (ROA and industry adjusted ROA) of CEO during the …nal 4 years in o¢ ce has an economically signi…cant e¤ect on the number of outside board seats they serve after retirement, but market performance does not explain it. Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) …nd that the performance of …rm which he has served as a director has a positive e¤ect on the number of other appointments (other …rms'outside directorships) held by him, which is consistent with Fama and Jensen (1983) . Keys and Li (2004) …nd that professional director are three times more likely to receive additional directorships following a successful tender o¤er for a …rm on which they served as board members. Lee (2007c) analyzes directorships held by 250 CEOs who retired during 1998-2002 in the two years after retirement and …nds counter-evidences that pre-retirement accounting performances do not have any explaning power for the number of outside directorships held by CEOs 2 years after retirement and the …rm size in which CEO worked before retirement is directly related to the number of outside directorship.
The quality of boards
Overally, many researches about corporate governance focus on the relationship between quality of candidate for outside directors and probability of serving as directors and conclude that the number of directorship a candidate serves increases in his quality level. A little light, however, has been shed on the determination of the quality of boards.
The goal of this paper is to explain the board quality using the matching framework.
Model

Model: Searching and Matching
I construct a searching and matching model in which both potential candidates for outside directorships and …rms live forever and are risk neutral. The basic framework stems from Pissarides (2000) . There are potential candidates for outside directorships and …rms which are normalized to 1. Every potential candidate i with heterogenous quality, q i new ; has an outside option, 2 so that their choice is whether to serve as an outside director or enjoy an outside option. The choice of the …rm is to decide whether to …ll a vacancy for an one outside director on boards or not. Neither quiting nor …ring are allowed. The quality, q i new ; is 2 [0, 1]: The vacancies and potential candidates who would be likely to contact (a subgroup of potential candidates) are assumed to meet each other randomly in the director market.
When a vacancy is created, the …rm j determines the minimum required quality level and post it. Then, the …rm j directs its search e¤ort toward the potential candidates who satisfy this level. Also, the potential candidates who can enjoy the higher value to work as the outside director in the …rm j than the outside option value would be likely to contact the …rm j. The …rm j meets potential candidates who would be likely to contact (the candidates below the cuto¤ level quality) at the rate # j : 3 I will explore below the nature of steady-state equilibrium and focus on the quality level of outside directors on boards. Hereafter, I omit the subscript i and j:
The value function
Firstly, I consider the supply side to develop the value function of a potential candidate for outside directors. I begin with the value of an outside directorship for a potential candidate with quality, q new ; in the …rm requiring minimum quality level, q min new : Neither 2 This assumption captures the following facts. Many CEOs have several job position opportunities after retirement except outside directorship (community board, goverment organization, o¢ cer in private …rms, consultant and so on). Ongoing CEOs also have many similar options. 3 In the classical random searching model, the contacting (meeting) function is given by
where u is the unemployment rate and v is the measure of vacancies. Under the assumptions that all workers are the same and all …rms are same, vacancies meet unemployed workers at the rate m( ) :
quiting nor …ring are allowed. 
The outside option value is de…ned by
The value for a potential candidate of quality, q new ; who enjoys an outside option is denoted by V o c (q new ) equals the return of an outside option plus
The return of an outside option is assumed to have a fuctional form denoted by
where is the sensitivity parameter and is the …xed return from an outside option.
This implies the return of outside option increase in the talent of candidates. We can rewrite equation (3) by
Secondly, I consider the vacancy for an outside director. Each …rm faces decision whether to …ll a vacancy for an one outside director on boards or not. n is the total size of outside board member when a …rm does not have any vacancy. The new outside director produces a performance, which requires only one factor, quality denoted by q new and he contributes to the performance of …rm by monitoring and advising on management. The value of the …rm of …lling a vacancy with a new outside director who has the quality 4 Hambrick and Johnson (2000) said "The majority of outside directors are fully motivated to act conscientiously and vigorously by forces other than a …nancial stake in the …rm: their sense of professionalism, concern for their reputations and stature, and the threat of lawsuit." (Colley and Stettinius (2003) , page 61). 5 The performance of …rms actually depends on the average quality level of outside directors on boards when the new director enters into baords. For the sake of exposition, I express the value function in terms of qnew: I will go in details later.
level, q new with quality requirement, q min new ; is given by
The return of …lling a vacancy is the expected performance of …rms with the new director.
Then, we can rede…ne
The value of not …lling a vacancy is given by
where # 6 denotes the arrival rate of potential candidates who try to …nd an outside director position satisfying the minimum quality level required by …rm. q s represents the average quality level of boards when the …rm does not …ll a vacancy. Rearranging equation (6), we can get
The performance of …rms
Here, I will derive the expected performance of …rm. Based on Weisbach and Hermalin (1998) , Holmstrom (1999) and Hermalin (2005) I set up the timing for the following. At the …rst stage, a …rm and a potential candidate for outside directors only have the prior distribution of the quality of the incumbent CEO, q 7 ; has mean > 0: In the second stage, the …rm and outside board members would be likely to …nd the ture quality of the CEO, q with the probability which is equal to the average board quality, q n (or q s ):
Otherwise, the …rm and outside board members learn nothing: If the …rm chooses a new outside director with quality level, q new ; then the …rm can …nd the true quality with probability q n = (n 1)q s + q new n ;
but the …rm learn nothing about the incumbent CEO with probability 1 q n : Finally, the …rm decides whether to …re the CEO or not based on the true quality q u or the prior expectation for the quality of the CEO and then the performance of the …rm is realized.
This three-stage process is iterated at each period because the quality of CEO is speci…c to the project implemented at each period and both the …rm and outside board members are uncertain about it. Since I focus on the steady-state path there is no dynamic change in the parameters. The quality of potentially replaced CEO is randomly distributed with mean 0 < : 8
As I assumed before, both the …rm and outside board members know that the CEO's ability is drawn from a distribution with mean at the …rst stage; which is the prior expectation of the CEO's quality. If the …rm and outside board members …nd the true quality for the quality of incumbent CEO with probability q n (or q s ), the incumbent CEO is …red if
It is clear that when the …rm …nds nothing, the incumbent CEO is retained.
CEO quality and Board quality
Case 1: Complement Now, I will derive the expected performance of …rm which depends on the quality of CEO and outside directors. I assume the symmetric complementarities (Becker (1981) and Becker (1993) ) between the CEO quality and board quality. Based on Murphy and Zabojnik (2004) and Gabaix and Landier (2007) , the expected performance (pro…t) of …rm when a vacancy is …lled by a new outside director is given by
where S denotes the value/size of the …rms 9 , 0 < < 1. Similarly, the expected performance of …rm when a vacancy is not …lled
I assume that the expected performance of …rm ; E[ (q k ; q n )]; mainly depends on the quality of a current CEO in …rm; q u ; or the quality of a replaced CEO in …rm; q r = 0;
multiplied by the advising role of outside directors on boards. The expected performance of a …rm when a vacancy is …lled by a new outside director is de…ned by
where the second line on the right-hand side represents the expected revenue of the …rm when the …rms …nd the true quality and the third line represent the expected revenue when the …rms …nd nothing: q n is the average quality of outside directors on boards.
F (q u ) is the retaining probability of the incumbent CEO. We can easily …nd E[ (q k ; q s )]
by similar method. Finally, we can get
where
Here, I assume that q u < F (q u ) : Otherwise, there is no …ring because the ture quality of the incumbent CEO is always greater than the prior expectation of the potentially replaced CEO.
Case 2: Substitute Let me suppose that CEO quality and Board quality are substitutes 11 . By adopting the production function originally introduced by Sah and Stiglitz (1986) , the expected performance of …rm; E[ (q k ; q n )]; is given by
where a and c are given constant. q u max and u max represent the maximum value of the true quality of the incumbent CEO and the maximum of the mean of the prior expectation for the incumbent CEO's talent, respectively.
The implications for the board compensations
Case 1: Complement The compensation to each board member is assumed to be equal to the marginal productivity of the average board quality by
The marginal productivity of the board quality by the monitoring is expressed by ( ; S)q i , which represents the expected gain from the perfect information for the incumbent CEO minus the expected gain from the prior information. The marginal productivity by the advising is given by ( ; S)q i + S > 0 1 0 You can …nd the similar setting in Hermalin (2005) . 1 1 Eric Rasmusen points out that CEO quality and board quality can be substitutes in a sense that the good CEO can dominate the decision-making or the decision of CEO can be overriden by the good board.
Proposition 1 (1) The compensation for directors increases in the value/size of …rms.
(2) The compensation for directors increases in the prior expectaion for the quality of incumbent CEOs if the average board quality is less than 1/2.
Proof. See in Appendix
It is straightforward that the high value/size of …rm makes the role of monitoirng and advising on boards more valuable. The increase in the prior expectation for the incumbent CEO talent ( ) makes the quality of board less important in terms of the monitoring.
Simply, we can interpret the marginal productivity of monitoring as the expected revenue (gain) from …nding the true quality minus the expected revenue (gain) from …nding nothing. From the view point of the monitoring, the increase in the expected talent of the incumbent CEO makes the board less important, but the marginal productivity of advising goes up when the expected talent of the incumbent CEO increases. Here, the point is that the increase in the marginal productivity of advising diminishes when the board quality rises. Conclusively, the marginal productivity of board quality increases when the average board quality is less than 1/2.
Case 2: Substitute In this case, the compensation to each board member is given by
Proposition 2 (1) The compensation for directors increases in the value/size of …rms.
(2) The compensation for directors decreases in the prior expectaion for the quality of incumbent CEOs.
Proof. Omitted
It is also straightforward that the high value/size of …rm makes the role of monitoirng and advising on boards more valuable. Be careful that the advising role becomes less important when the prior expectation for the CEO quality rises. Since we assume that the good CEO can dominate the decision making or the CEO's decision can be overridden by the board, the highly talented CEO can make the board less important even in terms of advising.
The implications for the CEO compensations
Case 1: Complement Here, we can have two di¤erent implications for the e¤ect of board quality on the incumbent CEO's compensations. The above executive compens-ations (W CEO ) is composed of two parts, given by
CEO is the compensation level of the incumbent CEO 12 , and W r CEO denotes the wage level of the potentially replace CEO. Here, I only focus on the wage level of the incumbent CEO. Suppose that given the board quality, the wage of the incumbent CEO (W u CEO ) is equal to the expected marginal productivity of the incumbent CEO's quality when he is not …red, denoted by
Then, the good quality boards pay more to the incumbent CEO if the average board quality is higher than 1/2. It implies that when the e¤ect of the advsing is high enough, the marginal productivity of the incumbent CEO increases with respect to the board quality.
Case 2: Substitute From the equation (10), (W u CEO ) is given by
Then, the good quality boards pay less to the incumbent CEO. First of all, when the board quality increases, the probability of the incumbent CEO's …ring increases. Second, the good board makes the CEO less valuable because the good board can dominate the decision.
In a totally di¤erent angle, we can predict that the high quality boards make the …rms pay more to incumbent CEOs based on Hermalin (2005) 13 . He assumes that a CEO will accept the wage level, W u CEO ; if his expected utility is greater than some reservation utility, U : He also assumes that if a CEO will not be …red, he enjoys some additional bene…ts, b. Then, he accepts W u CEO only if
Under the assumptions that the above constraint is binding, the CEO compensation is given by
> 0; which implies that the CEO compensations increase in the board quality.
1 2 I assume that W u CEO is given to the incumbent CEO before …nding a good information or bad information.
1 3 See Hermalin (2005) , page 2369.
The cuto¤ quality of searching
Now, I will derive the endogenous cuto¤ quality level of searching an outside director position, denoted by q cut new : To that purpose, I solve the following equation which characterizes the cuto¤ level
For the simplicity, I supress the cost part of E[ (q k c ; q cut new )] in the equation (9) 14 and assume that = 1. The left side represents the bene…t of outside directorship and the right side of the cost of outside directorship. The cuto¤ level is determined to equate above equation.
Proposition 3 Under some restrictions for the parameters, there exist a unique cuto¤ quality level which guarantees that the potential candidates with q new q cut new are likely to contact. Then, (1) the cuto¤ quality level increases in the value/size of the …rms in the both "complement" and "substitute" case. (2) The cuto¤ quality level increases in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs if the average board quality is less
in the "complement" case and less than n 2 n in the "substitute" case.
Proof. See in Appendix.
The driving force behind the increase in the cuto¤ quality level is straightforward.
As shown above, the potential candidates maximize the money value plus the reputation value generated by outside directors, given by
The marginal productivity of average board quality, increases in the value of …rms (S).
The logic behind this is for the following. Gabaix and Landier (2007) assume that the managerial impact of CEO increases when the resource under his control increases. In line with this notion, the e¤ect of the board becomes large in the large …rm due to the increase in the impact of monitoring and advising. Henceforth, both the money value and the reputation value increases, which makes the board position more attractive.
The increase in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs makes board positions more valueable. Intuitively, when the expected talent of the incumbent CEO is good, the monitoring becomes less useless. However, the impact of the advising becomes more important due to the complementarity between the quality of the CEO and board of directors. If the board quality is low enough, the increased gain in the advising outweighs the increased loss in the monitoring.
The minimum quality level
The minimum quality level for a new outside director required by the …rm is endogenously determined to equate the following equation 15 .
I also suppress the cost part of E[ (q k c ; q min new )] in the equation (9) 
Plugging equation (17) into (16) we can get …rms, S. (2) The minimum quality level increases in the prior expectation for the incumbent CEOs, ; if the average board quality is less than
Proof. See in Appendix
When the value/size of …rms increases, both the cost and bene…t of one more searching rise. However, the increase in the bene…t outweighs the increase in the cost of bene…t. Conclusively, the minimum quality level increases in the size/value of …rms. More concretely, the cuto¤ quality level increases in the value/size of …rms and this causes the minimum quality level to increase. When the cuto¤ level rises, the aggregate arrival rate # j increase, which implies that the …rms are more likely to meet talented candidates in the future. Henceforth the …rms can set up the high minimum quality level. This logic also could be applied to the increase in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs.
3.6 The steady-state equilibrium quality of boards I will focus on the case that there exist a unique and interior cuto¤ quality level which guarantees that the potential candidates with q new q cut new would be likely to contact the …rm. The matching is randomly consummated between the potential candidate in q min new q new q cut new and the …rm requiring q min new because all matches satis…es the following conditions:
The equilibrium quality of a new director q new is de…ned by 
Then, the equilibrium quality of a new director q new boils down to
and the equilibrium quality of boards boils down to
Proposition 5 (1) The equilibrium quality of a new director q new would increase in the value/size of …rm, S (2) The equilibrium quality of a new director q new would increase in the prior expectation for the incumbent CEOs, if the average board quality is less than
We already discussed the driving force behind the increase in the cuto¤ quality level and minimum quality level. The equilibrium quality of a new director q new , is determined by the random matching between q min new and q cut new ; so it is clear that the increase in the value of …rms and the prior expectation for the talent of incumbent CEOs make the boards highly quali…ed.
Data and empirical result 4.1 Proxy for quality of boards
The Board members are usually composed of …rm's executives (CEO, CFO etc.,), other …rms' CEOs, executives, retired CEOs, lawyers, professors and so on. In this paper, I
focus on the quality of outside directors, specially ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs from other …rms. When we proxy the quality of retired CEOs and current CEOs, there are two possible candidates.
The …rst one is the total compensations paid to them when they worked/are working as CEOs. Gabaix and Landier (2007) develop the model which shows that the best CEO goes to the largest …rm in a competitive assignment market and the larger …rms pay more to CEOs. Their empirical …nding supports this argument. In this sense, the total compensation level paid to them when they worked/are working as CEOs could re ‡ect thier quality 18 . Secondly, the …rm size at which they worked before retirements/are working is a good proxy for the quality. Gabaix and Landier (2007) Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample.
T able 1 Almost half of the outside directors on boards is ongoing CEOs in other …rms plus retired
CEOs from other company. The boards tend to contain more retired CEOs (2.5) than 1 8 In a slightly di¤erent angle, Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) show that the equilibrium wage is increasing and convex in the ability of agents in the hierarchies of …rms because the top managers share their ability with a team under their control. The …rms pay top managers more than proportional to their talent. So, the log value of the wage could be the better proxy for the quality of ongoing/retired CEOs. 1 9 Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) also show that the …rm size in which CEOs worked before retirement well explains the number of outside directorship held by CEOs 2 years after retirement.
2 0 Additionally, the accounting performance is the possible candidate. Brickley, Linck and Coles (1999) analyze directorships held by 277 CEOs who retired during 1989-1993 after they retired and show that the accounting performance (ROA and industry adjusted ROA) of CEOs during the …nal 4 years in o¢ ce has an economically signi…cant e¤ect on the number of outside board seats they hold after retirement. The …nal one is the change in the market capitalization of …rms they worked/are working as CEOs. The stock return during tenure is the another possibilty, but Eric Rasmusen provides the helpful comments about this. He said " The stock return of the old company is not good enough. If a CEO is predicted when he begins his job to be good, then his company should just have a normal market return, not above-market. An above-market return only indicates he is doing better than expected." 2 1 The Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) provides board and committee information. We, however, need more detailed information for board members, so I handy-collect pro…les from SEC …lings. The median growth rate of executive compensations and market capitalizations are reported in Table 2 .
T able 2 Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for the quality of boards. Here, the proxies for the quality of boards is the averaged CEO compensation levels as CEOs (See Table 3 
-A).
The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the quality of boards only averaged over retired CEOs on boards is signi…cantly higher than the quality of boards averaged over ongoing CEOs on boards. Table 3-B also supports this …nding. The mean quality of retired CEOs who work as outside directors in 2005 is signi…cantly higher than the mean quality of ongoing CEOs on boards. The …fth and last column of Table 3-A provide evidence that the quality of directors on the same board is dispersed. For instance, the mean level of the ranking di¤erence between the highest talented director and the lowest one on the same board is 226.88.
T able 3
Overall quality of boards: empirical result
Based on Proposition 5, the speci…cation is given by
where q i is the average board quality of …rm i, S i is the value/size of …rm i and u i is the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO in the …rm i. The proxy for the value/size of …rm is (1) the market capitalization, (2) the amount of sales, and (3) the total assets. The proxy for the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO is the wage paid to the incumbent CEO. Table 4 shows the main outcome. The dependent variable in Table 4 is the quality of other …rms'ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs as outside directors on boards which is proxied by the natural log value of the averaged compensations as CEO. The independent variables are the characteristics of …rms which ongoing CEOs and retired CEOs work as board members. Overally, the talented candidates work (as outside directors) at …rms which have a large amount of sales. 24 In the Table 5 , I iterate the same regression with the di¤erent proxy for the quality, the market capitalization. The outcome is qualitatively similar as the outcome of Table 4 .
T able 5
Quality of new board members: sample selection
The drawback of previous approach is that I do not take into account the joining year where q new;j is the quality of newly joined director j on board i; S i is the value/size of …rm i and is the prior expectation for quality of the incumbent CEO of …rm i. Table 7 provides the outcome of the regression. 26 The approach is the same as Table   4 . In Table 7 -A and 7-B, the dependent variable is the quality of the newly joined director j on board i proxied by the compensation level as CEO and the market capitalization of the CEO's original …rm one year before joining the boards, respectively. Overally, the coe¢ cients of the market capitalizations of …rm i is positively signi…cant.
T able 7
We can interprete that the talented ongoing CEOs go to …rms which have the big size to work as outside directors on boards. However, the e¤ect of talented incumbent CEO is ambiguous. In the OLS estimations, the coe¢ cient of the Ln(CEO compensation) is positively signi…cant. However, there might be an endogeneity problem. From equation (10) and (11), we can see that the board quality might a¤ect the CEO compensation.
To test this, I use 2SLS. Based on Core and Larcker (1999) , I use the dummy variable whether the CEO also takes the chariman position or not as the instrument for the CEO compensaion. I also use the tenure as the CEO. The market capitalization is still positively signi…cant, but the e¤ect of the incumbent CEO's talent disappears.
Quality vs Experience
Here, an issue could be raised. Simply, we can have two possible theories to explain the emprical evidence: (1) Ongoing and former CEO's of big companies make better directors for any company, and (2) Ongoing and former CEO's of big comanies make good directors of big companies, but not small companies 27 . The argument of this paper is the …rst one.
In the second theory, the matching is consummated between the ongoing (former) CEOs of big company and the big company because the experience of big companies'ongoing (former) CEOs is more valued only in the big companies'boards, which implies that the driving force behind the matching is not the quality, but the experience 28 . To test this, I adopt the following strategy: I calculate the predicted board quality based on the …rst OLS estimation in Table 7 -A. Then, I measure the error term by
The high error term indicates the …rms which have ongoing (former) CEOs of bigger companies as outside directors than expected. The Wilcoxon rank-sum test shows that the return on asset (ROA) of …rms which are in the range of upper 75% error term is signi…cantly higher than complements. The …rms which perform well can get big …rms' ongoing (former) CEOs, which provides evidence that the deriving force behind the match in the directorship market is not the experience.
2 7 Eric Rasmusen enlights me that we can have two di¤erent interpretations for the outcome of regressions.
2 8 Konstantin Tyurin provides fruitful comments about this. He comments that " To put it plainly, your theory makes, among other things, a testable prediction about the relationship between quality of the company board and the size of the company. So ultimately you are testing whether the size of the company where a given former (or ongoing) executive is a currently a board member is positively related to the average size of the companies where he served (is serving) as CEO in the past (now). This is exactly the matching story you're trying to explore in your theoretical part. However, the matching may have nothing (or little) to do with quality of CEOs, but rather be explained by the fact that experience accumulated as a CEO in a jumbo company would be more valuable if the same person serves on board of another jumbo company, and, conversely, experience accumulated as a CEO is a smaller-sized company would be more valuable if the same individual serves on board of another smaller-sized company upon retirement. Then you have changed the story that you're trying to test: it's nothing to do with quality but has a lot to do with …nding a good match. To make an analogy with other markets (like marriage market), it's not the quality that is driving the outcome but rather the driving force is a good match. In other words, smaller-size companies' CEOs and board members may not be inferior in quality, but simply the experience accumulated in such smaller companies may be di¤erent from the experience in supersize companies. Then, it's not the quality that matters but the type of experience."
The board quality and CEO compensations
Here, I explore the e¤ect of board quality on the CEO compensations. There is academic discussion about the relationship between the corporate governance (or board structure) and the CEO compensations. Core and Larcker (1999) suggest that the …rms with weak board sturctures pay more to CEOs. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) argue that the current increase in the CEO compensations can be explained by the increase in managerial entrenchment. Conversely, Hermalin (2005) suggests that the increase in CEO pay is due to the tighter corporate governance. Gabaix and Landier (2007) provide evidence that the rise in CEO pay is partly due to the weak corporate governance, but the e¤ect is relatively small. First, I run the regression of the CEO compensations on the size, performances, and the board structures of …rms. Based on the equations (13) and (14), the basic speci…cation is
where W CEO;i denotes the CEO compensation of …rm i, S i is the value/size of …rm i, u i is the prior expectation for the incumbent CEO's quality of …rm i, and q i denotes the average board quality of …rms i:
T able 8 
The director compensations
Based on Proposition 1, I now regress the board compensations on the characterstics of …rms. In the "complement" case, the board compensations are given by W BOARD = 2 ( ; S)q i + S n (or n 1) and in the "substitute" case, the board compensations are given by
If follows that the basic empirical estimation is T able 9 Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics 29 and the distribution of board compensations 30 .
T able 10
Table 10 provides OLS and quantile estimation results. Overall, the …rms which have a large amount of sales and which have the good CEO pay more to board members.
When the amount of sale increases by 1%, the board compensations increases by 0.66%.
However, the e¤ect of sale is diminishing.
2 9 You can …nd another statistics for the board compensation in Adams (2003) and Linck, Netter and Yang (2006b) .
3 0 The median annual director fee per board meeting is 7.28 in $ thousand. I calculate the annual director fee per board meeting by Median annual director fee Median number of board meeting :
The median number of board meeting is based on Linck, Netter and Yang (2006b) . For the comparison, the median total cash compensation of CEO per day is 9.62 in $ thousand which is calculated by
The median total cash compensation of CEO working day ( 250)
Conclusion
I construct a searching and matching model to explain the quality of outside directors on boards as an equilibrium phenomena. I assume that the quality of the CEO and board member interact with the value/size of …rms under their control. The model shows that the main determinants of board quality are the value/size of …rms and the expected talent of the incumbent CEO. This model also explains two observed facts that the talented candidates (good …rms) are sometimes matched to the bad (of course, not too bad) …rms (candidates) and the quality of directors on the same boards is dispersed.
The empirical evidence supports the prediction of size e¤ect. The talented ongoing
CEOs and retired CEOs go to the …rms which have the high market capitalization values and the large amount of sales. However, the e¤ect of incumbent CEO's talent is ambiguous. I also …nd that the …rms which have a large amount of sale pay more to outside directors, but the board compensation is not related with the board quality.
Appendix
Proof. of the proposition 1: Taking derivative the compensation of the board with respect to the size of the …rm, we can get
When we take derivative the compensation of the board with respect to the prior expectation of the incumbent CEO, it is given by
Thus, if q i < 1 2 ;then the board compensation increases in the prior expectation of the incumbent CEO. + ( + CEO S ) < + : Taking the partial derivative of the bene…c and cost of the outside directorships with respect to the size of the …rm in the "complement case", we can get
Replacing W BOARD by the equations (7) or (10), it can be easily shown that (16) is the cost of one more searching. It can be easily shown that
The right-hand side represents the bene…t of one more searching. For simplicity, let (1 + )
Rearranging above equation, 
At the minimum quality level,
Rearranging above equation (and simplifying notations),
Finally, we can get
In this model, I assume that the above condition is satis…ed. When the value/size of …rm increases, the increase in the bene…t outweighs the increase in the cost of bene…t. Conclusively, the minimum quality level increases in the size/value of …rms. By similar method, we can conclude that the minimum quality level increases in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs in the "complement" case if
and the minimum quality level increases in the prior expectation for the quality of incumbent CEOs in the "substitute" case if > 0 under the condition that
in the "complement case" and q i < n 2 n in the "substitute" case, then
Overally, the equalibrium quality of board member increases in the …rm value and the expectation for the talent of incumbent CEOs. 
